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Abstract—We present a system model, an enforcement mech-
anism, and a policy language for the proactive enforcement of
timed provisions and obligations. Our approach improves upon
existing formalisms in two ways: (1) we exploit the target system’s
existing functionality to avert policy violations proactively, rather
than compensate for them reactively; and, (2) instead of requiring
the manual specification of remedial actions in the policy, we
automatically deduce required actions directly from the policy. As
a policy language, we employ timed dynamic condition response
(DCR) processes. DCR primitives declaratively express timed
provisions and obligations as causal relationships between events,
and DCR states explicitly represent pending obligations. As key
technical results, we show that enforceability of DCR policies
is decidable, we give a sufficient polynomial time verifiable
condition for a policy to be enforceable, and we give an algorithm
for determining from a DCR state a sequence of actions that
discharge impending obligations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many security requirements can be decomposed into pro-
visions and obligations [4], [17], [26]. Provisions specify
conditions or properties dependent on the present and the past.
They cover most traditional access control requirements. For
example, access to customer records is granted to users in the
role of customer-relations manager, provided customer con-
sent was previously granted. Obligations, in contrast, impose
conditions on the future that an agent or process should fulfil.
For example, a hospital may need to delete patient records
within 14 days of a patient’s release.
Provisions and their enforcement by access control mech-
anisms are well understood. Obligations are less well under-
stood, and subject to active research [1], [3], [10]–[13], [18],
[20], [22]–[25], [31], [35]. Enforcement of obligations is diffi-
cult as, to be enforceable, obligations must be associated with
deadlines. A simple but limited enforcement mechanism is to
associate obligations with access control rules, whereby the
enforcement mechanism immediately takes the obliged action
when the rule grants access, e.g., logging the taken action.
Alternatively, obligations may be associated with deadlines,
whose expiration triggers remedial actions to be taken by the
access control mechanism.
The state of the art generally handles obligations in limited
ways, like those suggested above. The theory of how to
handle obligations is underdeveloped, especially when dead-
lines are involved. With few exceptions, policy violations are
not prevented, they are remediated. Namely, the enforcement
mechanism witnesses a deadline expiring, but is powerless to
prevent the concomitant policy violation and is reduced to
taking remedial actions after the fact, such as logging, lowering
a reputation, etc. Moreover, the enforcement mechanism’s
interaction with the target system is often too limited for
effective obligation enforcement or the exact extent of the
mechanism’s control over the target system is unclear. While
an enforcement mechanism can intercept actions and prevent
them from happening, it cannot, a priori, force the target
system to take action when required. Existing mechanisms
tend to take only actions independent of the target system’s
functionality, such as logging or sending notifications. We
expand on these points and discuss exceptions in Section VI.
Approach and Results. We tackle the problem of proactive
policy enforcement and present an enforcement mechanism
that directs the target system to prevent policy violations. Not
every policy can be enforced, and enforceability depends on
the enforcement mechanism’s exact powers over the target
system. We distinguish between whether the enforcement
mechanism can (1) control an action by denying that it happens
at a given point in time, (2) proactively cause an action to
happen in the target system, or (3) merely observe that an
action happens in the target system.
The above distinctions are critical. For some actions, e.g.
a patient at a hospital dies, it is neither meaningful for an
enforcement function to deny nor cause the action to happen.
In other cases it may make sense for a mechanism to control
whether the action is allowed, but not for the mechanism to
cause the action to happen by itself. For instance, a hospital
IT system may be able to deny the immediate re-admission of
a released patient; however, it cannot outright cause a patient
to be readmitted, as that would require the patient’s consent.
Finally, some actions may be both controllable and causable,
e.g., the enforcement mechanism can both deny and proac-
tively cause the transfer of records from local data storage to
a remote archive, depending on the exact circumstances. Such
distinctions between controllable (in the sense of denying)
and uncontrollable (but observable) actions are well-known in
other areas, such as supervisory-control theory [32]. Here the
supervisor plays the role of the enforcement mechanism; how-
ever, in the classical supervisory-control theory, the supervisor
does not cause actions in the target system.
These observations motivate the following technical ques-
tions, answered in this paper. Given the ability to cause
certain actions to happen in the target system, how do we
decide whether a given policy is in fact enforceable? Can
we efficiently compute a sequence of actions sufficient to
resolve a given impending obligation violation? And in what
sense can this be done transparently in that the enforcement
mechanism alters the target system’s behaviour only when
absolutely required by the policy?
Answering these questions necessarily involves a system
model, a policy language, and an enforcement mechanism.
The system model must clarify how the target system and the
enforcement mechanism interact and what the mechanism can
and cannot cause or control in the target system. The policy
language must be expressive enough to formulate realistic
policies, yet constrained enough that we can efficiently com-
pute (1) whether a policy is enforceable and (2) which actions
are needed to avert impending obligation violations. Finally,
the enforcement mechanism connects the system model and
the policy, using the latter to compute action sequences for
execution by the former.
In our policy language, it must be possible to express
declaratively timed properties of both the past and the future,
close to their natural-language formalisation. Moreover, we
need a run-time representation that can be updated as events
occur, and we must also be able to plan the actions to be taken
to avoid violating obligations. Standard approaches, based on
metric temporal logics for specifications and automata for the
run-time representation, depend on a translation from formu-
las into automata, which suffers from state-space explosion.
The formalism that we will use, Timed Dynamic Condition
Response Processes (DCR processes, for short), combines the
declarative specification and run-time representation, avoiding
this translation. As we will show, this allows us to compute
plans and enforce policies at run-time based directly on the
declarative specification, avoiding translation to an exponen-
tially larger operational model.
Untimed DCR processes were introduced in [8] as a process
language for describing DCR graphs [15], a declarative graph-
ical process notation. DCR processes are expressive enough
for many security applications: For untimed properties they are
equivalent in their expressivity to Bu¨chi automata [8], but their
language primitives are rather different. Instead of specifying
processes in terms of states and transitions, a DCR process
describes the causal relationships between events declaratively
in terms of conditions and responses, and describes dynamic
conflict relationships between events in terms of exclusions
and inclusions. To allow for the specification of timed polices,
we conservatively extend the DCR process language intro-
duced in [8] to allow for describing timed DCR graphs [16].
Contributions. Conceptually, we present a system model, a
policy language, and an enforcement mechanism for timed
provisions and obligations. Our enforcement mechanism de-
duces those actions necessary to avert policy violations and
proactively causes the target system to take these actions in
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Fig. 1. System Model
the nick of time, that is, whenever a deadline is about to be
missed.
This approach improves upon existing formalisms in two
ways: (1) we exploit the target system’s existing functionality
to avert proactively policy violations, rather than to compen-
sate reactively for them, and, (2) rather than requiring the
manual specification of remedial actions in the policy, we
automatically deduce relevant actions directly from the policy.
Technically, we show that the enforceability of policies
expressed as timed DCR processes is decidable but NP-hard.
We then give a sufficient polynomial time verifiable condition
for a DCR policy to be enforceable. Moreover, we give an
algorithm that, given a DCR state of an enforceable DCR
policy, computes a sequence of actions that, when executed
on the target system, will discharge impending obligations.
As proof-of-concept, we have built a prototype implemen-
tation of the algorithms in this paper. The implementation
is available on-line at http://dcr.itu.dk/obligations along with
simulations of the examples presented in this paper.
Scope. We focus exclusively on policies governing the se-
quencing of actions. This approach plays to the strengths of
the DCR formalisms and helps focus the presentation on the
central issue of proactive policy enforcement. We leave open
extensions to the policy language, like the addition of events
dependent on data, and the question of whether and how
comparable enforcement mechanisms can be realised in other
formalisms.
Overview. In Section II we present our system model and
define enforcement. We present timed DCR processes in
Section III, and give examples of policies in Section IV. We
show in Section V when and how a DCR policy is enforceable
and report briefly on a prototype implementation of a DCR
policy enforcement point. Finally, in Sections VI and VII we
discuss related work and draw conclusions. Proofs and most
lemmas have been relegated to Appendix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ENFORCEMENT
A. System Model
Our system model is depicted in Figure 1. The target
system and the enforcement mechanism (also called a Policy
Enforcement Point, or simply PEP) are independently running
processes, which interact in three distinct ways:
1) Whenever the target system wishes to undertake some
controllable action, it requests permission from the en-
forcement mechanism (upper arrow, left to right), which
will return either “grant” or “deny” (upper arrow, right to
left). The target system actually undertakes the requested
action iff the enforcement mechanism responds “grant”.
2) Whenever the target system performs an uncontrollable
action, it informs the enforcement mechanism that it
does so (middle arrow).
3) Finally, a subset of actions of the target system, its
causable actions, are available to be triggered by the
enforcement mechanism, as indicated by the bottom
arrow labelled “cause”.
(1) and (2) ensure that the target system and the enforcement
mechanism are synchronised. (1) makes it possible to suppress
controllable actions, thereby enforcing provisions. Through
(3), the architecture supports the proactive policy enforcement.
Note that the target system may take internal actions not
observable by the enforcement mechanism; the policy enforced
must be independent of such internal actions.
In this paper we will restrict our attention to discrete time
systems (as in, e.g., [5], [27]) and assume that enforcement
mechanisms can only proactively cause actions within a time-
step, just before a tick of time. For example, if the target
system needs to undertake action a within deadline d, the
enforcement mechanism can, before some tick within the
deadline d, force the system to undertake action a, using
the lower arrow. Note that the enforcement mechanism relies
only on its own clock (indicated by the clock symbol in
the diagram). The model does not stipulate synchronisation
between the clocks of the enforcement mechanism and the
target system.
In practice, there are various ways that the abstract com-
munication in the above model can be realised. For example,
suppose the target system is an HTTP/REST component
within a larger system, and that “actions” are the external
invocation of its own APIs, or its own invocation of other
components’ APIs. The upper arrow can simply and crudely be
implemented by the enforcement mechanism intercepting and
selectively dropping incoming and outgoing requests; TCP’s
failure semantics will handle the rest. The middle arrow is
just listening to messages representing uncontrollable actions.
The lower arrow is the enforcement mechanism issuing HTTP
requests against the target system’s API. A more relaxed im-
plementation might see the enforcement mechanism realising
the upper arrow as its own HTTP/REST API.
B. Target System and Policies
Prior to formalising systems and policies, we first introduce
relevant notation. For a finite alphabet Σ of actions, we write
Σ∗ for the set of finite words over Σ, Σω for the infinite
words, and let Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪ Σω . As usual, we refer to a set
L of words as a language. We write concatenation of words
w and v as w · v and write v v w iff v is a prefix of w, i.e.
w = v · v′ for some word v′. We write w \ x for the word w
with every occurrence of the symbol x ∈ Σ removed. Finally,
we let prefixes(L) be the prefix closure of the language L and
write  for the empty word.
We account for time by requiring a special symbol tick
in our alphabets; the passage of time is indicated by the
occurrence of this tick action. We say that a word is non-
Zeno if it is finite or contains infinitely many tick actions; a
language L is non-Zeno if every word in it is non-Zeno.
Now, following the system model, a target system is a lan-
guage over an alphabet of uncontrollable actions, controllable
actions, causable actions, and time.
Definition 1: A target system (S,Σ,Γ,∆) comprises a
prefix-closed language S ⊆ Σ∗ with tick ∈ Σ; controllable
actions Γ ⊆ Σ \ {tick}; and causable actions ∆ ⊆ Σ \ {tick}.
In this definition, prefix-closure ensures that the target
system S produces actions consecutively. Time is considered
neither controllable nor causable: it can be neither suppressed
nor caused. We consider only the finite behaviour of the
target system due to our focus on the enforcement of safety
properties in the form of provisions and deadlines. Still,
timed security policies may speak of safety properties that
are never fulfilled for finite sequences, such as the property,
that “an examination must be performed every other month”.
Consequently, we define policies as non-Zeno languages over
both finite and infinite sequences.
Definition 2: A security policy P over an alphabet Σ with
tick ∈ Σ is a non-Zeno language P ⊆ Σ∞.
Example 3: As a running example, consider a target system
t = (S,Σ,Γ,∆) with alphabet Σ = {a, b}, causable actions
∆ = {a}, controllable actions Γ = {b}, and language S
defined by the regular expression (a + b + tick)∗, i.e., any
finite sequence over a, b, and tick. We want to enforce the
policy P defined by the ω-regular expression (a+ tick)ω , i.e.,
b is never allowed, and every tick is preceded by at least one a.
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
Now, what should an enforcement mechanism accomplish?
We define here abstractly the requirements for such a mech-
anism. Later, in Section V, we give a concrete instance.
Following [24], [31], the result of enforcement should be
a stream of actions performed jointly by the target system
and the enforcement mechanism. Clearly, the mechanism
should ensure that this stream complies with the policy being
enforced. However, rather than retroactively translating the
output of the target system as done in most previous work,
our focus is on proactive enforcement: the enforcement mech-
anism directs the target system by suppressing and causing
actions. It cannot cause actions not enabled in the target system
to happen, i.e., it does not add to the possible behaviours.
To capture what it means to direct the target system,
we define the directed language of a monotone, idempotent
function m : S → S as the least fixed point of “directed steps”
extending the execution of an already directed trace w by an
action a into m(w · a).
Definition 4: Let (S,Σ,Γ,∆) be a target system, and let
m : S → S be a monotone and idempotent function. Define
the directed language Dm of m inductively by
1) m() ∈ Dm
2) m(w·a) ∈ Dm whenever w ∈ Dm, a ∈ Σ, and w·a ∈ S.
Note that monotonicity (i.e. if v v w then m(v) v m(w)) and
idempotency (i.e. m(m(v)) = m(v)) means respectively, that
the function m does not retroactively change its past decisions
and it agrees with its own directives.
An enforcement mechanism for a target system can now be
defined as a function m : S → S for which the directed steps
respect the constraints of controllable and causable actions,
and only cause actions immediately before a tick action.
Definition 5: An enforcement mechanism for a target system
(S,Σ,Γ,∆) is a recursive, monotone, and idempotent function
m : S → S satisfying:
1) m() = 
2) for all v ∈ Dm and a ∈ Σ with v · a ∈ S, we have
m(v · a) = m(v) · w where w satisfies:
a) if a = tick then w ∈ ∆∗ · tick;
b) if a ∈ Γ then w ∈ {, a}; and
c) otherwise w = a.
When m is an enforcement mechanism, we will call Dm the
enforcement language.
The conditions on the function m formalise that: (1) m will
wait for time to pass or the target system to take an action
before acting; (2a) m cannot stop the passage of time, but
may cause actions in ∆ to be taken just before a tick; (2b) m
may either suppress or preserve controllable actions; and (2c)
m must preserve uncontrollable actions.
Example 6: We define a function m : S → S for the target
system t of Example 3. The function m removes all bs and
inserts a before tick when necessary.
m(w) = n(w \ b)
n(w) =

 when w = 
a · tick when w = tick
n(w · tick) · a · tick when w = w′ · tick · tick
n(w′) · x otherwise, assuming wlog
w = w′ · x
It is straightforward to verify that both m and n are recursive,
monotone, and idempotent functions, and to prove by induc-
tion on w that the directed language Dm of m is exactly the
set Dm = prefixes
(
(a+ tick)ω
)
. Moreover, it is easy to see
that m satisfies the remaining conditions of Definition 5.
We proceed to consider correctness and transparency. Our
notion of correctness necessarily deviates from standard no-
tions. In the presence of pending obligations, the current
(corrected) output m(v) might not be a word of the policy.
However, it must be extensible to one that is. Intuitively, the
extension w discharges pending obligations, taking the output
string m(v) · w back into the policy language.
Definition 7: Let P be a policy over Σ. An enforcement
mechanism m is correct for P iff for all v ∈ Dm there exists
some w ∈ Σ∞ such that v · w ∈ P .
A violation of the policy P is a word u that has no possible
extension to a word in the policy: no matter what the target
system subsequently does, it will never get u back within
the bounds of the policy. This situation would arise if, for
example, an impermissible action was executed, or a deadline
was missed. Our notion of correctness is such that a correct
enforcement mechanism will tolerate no such finite violations
Lemma 8: Define the finite violations language P¯ of a policy
P over Σ by P¯ = Σ∗ \ prefixes(P). If m is correct for policy
P then for all v ∈ Dm we have m(v) 6∈ P¯ .
Note that this language is closely related to the notion of
bad prefixes for languages over infinite words, defined in [21].
We now formulate transparency in terms of the finite
violations language:
Definition 9: Let m be an enforcement mechanism for a
target system (S,Σ,Γ,∆). We say that m is transparent iff
for all v ∈ Dm and a ∈ Σ such that v · a ∈ S , whenever
m(v · a) 6= m(v) · a then m(v) · a ∈ P¯ .
That is, a transparent enforcement mechanism modifies an
action a iff taking the action would violate the policy.
Example 10: Continuing Example 6, we saw that the
enforcement language of Dm is exactly the prefixes of the
policy P = (a+ tick)ω and hence m is a correct enforcement
mechanism. It is straightforward to verify by cases on the last
symbol of w that it is also transparent. Note that while the
policy language P contains no finite words, the enforcement
language Dm does: prefixes(P) = Dm.
The question remains of how to construct useful enforce-
ment mechanisms and build practical, running PEPs based on
them. In the coming sections, we will show how timed DCR
processes can be used for this purpose.
III. POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
We present here timed DCR processes, the semantics of
which defines a security policy over an alphabet Σ in the sense
of Definition 2. The language is closely based on the core
DCR process language [8], conservatively extended to make
it possible to express timed DCR graphs as introduced in [16].
DCR processes are about events E and constraints between
events. Constraints define under what circumstances (1) events
may or may not happen, and (2) under what circumstances they
may be required to happen in the future or be dynamically
excluded from (or re-included to) the process.
In general, each event e ∈ E has an associated label `(e) ∈
Σ \ {tick}. The set Σ (which includes tick) will be used as
the (finite) alphabet for defining the language recognised by
a timed DCR process. For simplicity, we restrict our attention
to DCR processes where E = Σ \ {tick} and `(e) = e.
A. Syntax
A DCR process P = [M ] T comprises a marking M and a
term T ; the full syntax is given in Figure 2. Here N is the set
of natural numbers, excluding 0. The marking M specifies the
state of events; the term T specifies both constraints between
events, and the effects on that state of executing events. We
explain terms and markings separately.
Terms. Terms describe constraints and effects between events
as follows.
• A condition e • k←− f imposes the constraint that for the
event e to happen, the event f must either previously
T,U ::= e • k←− f condition, k ∈ N ∪ {0}
| e •d−→ f response, d ∈ N ∪ {ω}
| e→+ f inclusion
| e→% f exclusion
| e ← f milestone
| T | U parallel
| 0 unit
Φ ::= (h, i, r) event state
M,N ::= M, e : Φ marking
| 
P,Q ::= [M ] T process
Fig. 2. DCR Process Syntax.
have happened at least k time units ago, or currently be
excluded. Note that k is a natural number or zero.
• A response e •d−→ f imposes the effect that when e
happens, f becomes pending (obliged) and must happen
within d time units or be excluded. Note that the deadline
d is a natural number or infinity (“eventually”), but cannot
be zero—one cannot require things to happen “now”.
• An exclusion e →% f imposes the effect that when e
happens, it excludes f . An excluded event cannot happen;
it is ignored as a condition. Moreover, it need not happen
if pending, unless it is subsequently re-included.
• An inclusion e →+ f imposes the effect that when the
event e happens, it re-includes the event f .
• A milestone e ← f imposes the constraint that for the
event e to happen, the event f must be either not pending
or excluded.
If several condition (response) constraints are defined be-
tween the same two events in T , the process will have the
maximal delay (minimal deadline). An untimed process [8]
corresponds to a timed process with all delays 0 and all
deadlines ω, so we write e •−→ f for e •ω−→ f and f •←− e
for f • 0←− e.
Example 11: Recall the obligation of the hospital given in
the introduction, where the event delete (“the patient’s record
is deleted”) must happen within 14 days after the event release
(“a patient is released from the hospital”). We specify this
obligation with a timed response relation:
release •14d−−→ delete .
If we instead wish to model the provision that the event archive
(“archiving data”’) cannot be followed by the event unarchive
(“delete archived data”) for at least 8 years, we use a timed
condition:
unarchive • 8y←− archive .
Markings. The marking M is a finite map from events to
triples (h, i, r), called the event state. The first component,
h ∈ N ∪ {0,⊥}, indicates whether the event happened, and
if so how many ticks ago, i.e., the event’s age. Namely, h ∈
N ∪ {0} represents that the event happened h ticks ago and
⊥ represents that it did not happen. Note that an event may
happen several times, and the state only records the age of
the last occurrence. The second component, i ∈ {⊥,>}, is a
boolean indicating whether the event is currently (i)ncluded.
Finally, the third component, r ∈ N ∪ {0, ω,⊥}, indicates
whether the event is a pending (r)esponse, that is, obliged
to happen in the future, and if so a possible deadline. Here
r = ⊥ represents that it is not pending, a natural number
r ∈ N∪{0} represents an unfulfilled obligation that the event
should happen within r time steps, and ω represents that the
event is obliged to happen eventually, i.e. without any fixed
deadline. We write dom(M) for the domain of the marking
M and take dom([M ] T ) = dom(M). As is commonly done
for environments, we write markings as finite lists of pairs
of events and states, e.g., M = e1 : Φ1, . . . , ek : Φk. We
understand the extension M, e : Φ of such an environment M
to be undefined when e ∈ dom(M).
B. Enabledness and effects
A process [M ] T has some subset of its events enabled.
Enabled events can be executed and will, when executed, apply
an effect to the marking M , yielding a new marking M ′. We
shall use these notions in Section III-C to define a timed
labelled transition system (LTS) for a given DCR process
[M ] T , which has markings as states and event executions
and time steps as transitions. Given this LTS, we can then
define the language accepted by [M ] T .
The notions of enabled events and effects are given by
the judgement [M ] T ` e : E, I,R, defined in Figure 3.
The judgement should be read: “in the marking M under the
constraints T , e is enabled and will when executed have the
effect of excluding events E, including events I , and recording
the pending responses R, possibly with deadlines.”
Rules 1–2 formalise constraints between events. The first
rule says that if f is a condition for e, then e can happen only
when (1) it is itself included, and (2) if f is included, then f
previously happened at least k steps ago. The second says that
if f is a milestone for e, then e can happen only if (1) it is
itself included, and (2) if f is included, then it is not pending.
Rules 3–5 formalise the effects an event might have on other
events (and itself). The third rule says that if f is a response
to e with deadline d and e is included, then e can happen with
the effect of making f pending with deadline d. The fourth
(respectively fifth) rule says that if f is included (respectively
excluded) by e and e is included, then e can happen with the
effect of including (respectively excluding) f .
Rules 6–8 formalise the composition of rules. The sixth rule
says that for the completely unconstrained process 0, an event
e can happen if it is currently included. The seventh rule says
that a relation allows any included event e to happen without
effects when e is not constrained by that relation; that is, when
e is not the relation’s left-hand–side event. Finally, the last rule
accounts for compositionality: it says that if both T1 and T2
i⇒ h ≥ k
[M,f : (h, i, ), e : ( ,>, )] e • k←− f ` e : ∅, ∅, ∅
(1)
i⇒ r = ⊥
[M,f : ( , i, r), e : ( ,>, )] e ← f ` e : ∅, ∅, ∅ (2)
[M, e : ( ,>, )] e •d−→ f ` e : ∅, ∅, {f : d}
(3)
[M, e : ( ,>, )] e→+ f ` e : ∅, {f}, ∅ (4)
[M, e : ( ,>, )] e→% f ` e : {f}, ∅, ∅ (5)
[M, e : ( ,>, )] 0 ` e : ∅, ∅, ∅ (6)
e 6= f
[M, e : ( ,>, )] f R f ′ ` e : ∅, ∅, ∅ (7)
[M ] T1 ` e : E1, I1, R1 [M ] T2 ` e : E2, I2, R2
[M ] T1 | T2 ` e : E1 ∪ E2, I1 ∪ I2, R1 ∪R2 (8)
Fig. 3. Enabling and effects. We write “ ” for “don’t care” and write R for
any of the relations • k←−,←, •d−→, →+, or →%.
allow an event to execute, then so does T1 | T2, with the effect
of the event being the union of the component effects.
We proceed to define how the effects derived in Figure 3
affect a marking. Suppose e is enabled in the process [M ] T
with the effect δ = (E, I,R). We first register in the state
of e that it happened now (setting the age to 0) and that
it is no longer pending (setting the response deadline to
⊥). Formally, we define e〈M〉 inductively by e〈〉 =  and
e〈M,f : (h, i, r)〉 = e〈M〉, f : (h′, i′, r′), where (h′, i′, r′) =
(0, i,⊥) if e = f and otherwise (h′, i′, r′) = (h, i, r). We then
apply the effect δ = (E, I,R) of the event, that is, excluding
the events in E, including the events in I and registering
response deadlines given in R. Formally, we inductively define
δ〈M〉 by δ〈〉 =  and
δ〈M,f : (h, i, r)〉
= δ〈M〉, f : (h, (i ∧ f 6∈E) ∨ f ∈I︸ ︷︷ ︸
included?
, r′
)
, (9)
where r′ = min{d | f : d ∈ R} if f : d ∈ R and r′ = r
otherwise. That is, if f : d ∈ R then f is marked pending
with the minimal deadline d for which f : d ∈ R; otherwise,
it keeps the deadline recorded in the current state. Note that if
an event is both excluded and included by the effect, inclusion
takes precedence.
Example 12: Consider the process
[release : (⊥,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>,⊥)] release •14d−−→ delete .
(10)
Both events have the same state: they have not been previously
executed, they are included, and they are not pending, i.e., have
no obligation to eventually execute. Following Figure 3, we
find that both events are enabled with the following effects:
release : ∅, ∅, {delete : 14d} and delete : ∅, ∅, ∅ .
Applying first the event release to the marking of (10), we
obtain the following (where we highlight changes in grey ):
release〈release : (⊥,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>,⊥)〉
= release : ( 0 ,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>,⊥) .
Now applying the effect (∅, ∅, {delete : 14d}) we get
(∅, ∅, {delete : 14d})〈release : (0,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>,⊥)〉
= release : (0,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>, 14d ) .
That is, release is registered as having happened now (age 0)
and delete is registered with deadline 14d. A second example:
[archive : (⊥,>, ω), unarchive : (⊥,>,⊥)]
unarchive • 8y←− archive .
This process has only the single enabled and pending event
archive : ∅, ∅, ∅. The unarchive event is not enabled, as it has
an unfulfilled condition. Executing archive yields the following
marking (this time skipping the intermediate steps):
archive : ( 0 ,>, ⊥ ), unarchive : (⊥,>,⊥) .
In the new marking, archive is registered as having just
happened (age 0) and no longer pending (response deadline
⊥). The event unarchive is still not enabled, as the age of
archive must be at least 8y for unarchive to be enabled.
Example 13: Returning to the running example, we rep-
resent that the event a should happen before every tick by
making it initially pending and having itself as a response with
deadline 1, and we suppress b by making it initially excluded:
[a : (⊥,>, 0), b : (⊥,⊥,⊥)] a •1−→ a . (11)
When applying the event a to the marking, a gets the state
( 0 ,>, ⊥ ), i.e. age 0 and no longer pending, but when we
subsequently apply the effect (∅, ∅, {a : 1}), the deadline is set
to 1 thus yielding the marking [a : ( 0 ,>, 1 ), b : (⊥,⊥,⊥)].
C. Transition semantics
Prior to defining the LTS of a DCR process [M ] T , we
must account for time. First, we define the function deadline
inductively on markings:
deadline() = ω
deadline(M, e : (h, i, r)) = min{r′, deadline(M) }
where r′ = r if i = >, else r′ = ω. That is, deadlines of
excluded events are ignored. We use the deadline function to
ensure that time cannot progress beyond any deadline of an
included event. When time advances, we update the marking
by incrementing histories (“it is now k + 1 steps since the
[M ] T ` e : δ
T `M e−→ δ〈e〈M〉〉 [EVENT]
deadline(M) > 0
T `M tick−−→ tick〈M〉
[TIME]
Fig. 4. Transition semantics.
event e happened”) and decrementing deadlines (“there are
now k − 1 steps left before we must do event e”). Formally,
we inductively define the effect of tick on a marking:
tick〈〉 = ,
tick〈M, e : (h, i, r)〉 = tick〈M〉, e : (h+ 1, i,max{0, r − 1}),
where ⊥+ 1 = ⊥, ⊥− 1 = ⊥ and ω− 1 = ω. Using tick〈−〉
and deadline, we give timed transition semantics to processes
in Figure 4. The event transition M e−→M ′ applies the effect
of an enabled event e to the marking M . Note that in general
more than one event e might be enabled. The time transition
M
tick−−→ M ′ advances the time by one in the marking M . In
examples so far, we have given relative time with units like 14d
or 8y. These units are just a convenience; one may normalise
them to seconds, in which case they would be 1209600 or
252460800 respectively.
The transitions give rise to a timed event labelled transition
system (LTS).
Definition 14: A timed DCR process [M ] T defines a
timed event LTS, lts([M ] T ) = (M, E ′,→,M, `′,Σ), where
the components are: events E ′ = E unionmulti {tick}; transitions
→ ⊆ M × E ′ ×M, where M α−→ M ′ iff T ` M α−→ M ′;
states M = {M ′ |M →∗ M ′}; initial state M ; and labelling
defined by `′(e) = `(e) for e ∈ E and `′(tick) = tick.
Definition 15: A run of lts([M ] T ) is a finite or infinite
sequence of transitions starting from the initial state M =
M0
α0−→ · · ·, for αi ∈ E ′.
The LTS has a notion of acceptance: a run is accepting iff
it is non-Zeno and every response is eventually discharged.
Recall that we write “ ” for “don’t care”.
Definition 16: A run is live iff for every state Mi, if
whenever an event e is pending in Mi, i.e., Mi(e) = ( ,>, d)
for d 6= ⊥, then there exists some j ≥ i such that either
Mj
e−→Mj+1 or e is excluded in Mj , i.e., Mj(e) = ( ,⊥, ).
A run is accepting iff it is live and non-Zeno. A trace of a
process [M ] T is a possibly infinite word s = (si)i∈I such that
[M ] T has an accepting run Mi
αi−→ Mi+1 with si = `(αi).
The timed language lang(P ) of a process P is the set of traces
of P , which defines a security policy according to Definition 2.
Note that the set of traces is not necessarily prefix-closed,
e.g. the timed language of the running example process (11)
is indeed the policy (a+ tick)ω .
Example 17: The following is a run of the process of (10):
release : (⊥,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>,⊥)
release−−−−→ release : ( 0 ,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>, 14d )
tick−−→ release : ( 1 ,>,⊥), delete : (⊥,>, 13d )
delete−−−→ release : (1,>,⊥), delete : ( 0 ,>, ⊥ ) .
This run is non-Zeno and accepting. Other runs exist:
• release · tick is a non-accepting finite run.
• release · release · . . . is an infinite Zeno run.
• tick · tick · . . . is an infinite, non-Zeno, accepting run.
IV. DCR POLICY EXAMPLES
We now illustrate the mechanics of specifying provisions
and obligations in a DCR process. We use these examples to
clarify the subsequent discussion and results about the proac-
tive enforceability of obligations. We consider a typical health-
care data retention policy like [19] from [2, Section 3.3].
A. Data protection in hospitals
Hospitals balance the dual requirements of protecting pa-
tients’ privacy while documenting treatments given and pro-
cedures followed. This tension is resolved by retaining patient
records in a central hospital database during the treatment and
moving the records to a restricted-access archive shortly after
the patient’s release. In practice, a policy might look like this:
1) Records must be deleted within 14 days of release.
2) Records must not be deleted if archival is pending.
3) Records must be archived for at least 8 years.
4) Records must not be deleted should the patient be re-
admitted within the 14 days.
We formalise this policy as a DCR process. For clarity, we
consider only a single fixed patient and set of records. The
events are as follows:
release The patient is released.
delete The patient’s records are deleted from the cen-
tral database.
archive The patient’s records are copied from the central
database to the restricted long-term archive.
unarchive The archived records are deleted.
readmit The patient is re-admitted.
We formalise next the constraints T0 and effects. We model
the obligation 1) that records must be deleted within 14 days
of the patient’s release using a response.
release •14d−−→ delete
The provision in (2) is modelled using a milestone relation.
delete ← archive
Recall that a milestones means (in this case) that as long as we
have an unfulfilled obligation to execute archive, we cannot
execute delete.
Next, we model the retention requirement in (3) that records
must be archived by an (unbounded) response
release •−→ archive
and we model the timed provision that they should remain
for 8 years after archival by a condition relation with a time
constraint.
unarchive • 8y←− archive
Note, this rule says that 8 years must pass before archived
records can be deleted, not that they must in fact be deleted.
If the patient is re-admitted, we must remove the obligation
to delete records (4). We model this using exclusion.
readmit→% delete
Once the patient is (re-)released, we must reinstate the obli-
gation to delete records. We model this using inclusion.
release→+ delete
Putting these rules together and re-arranging them for clarity,
we obtain the following set of rules:
T0 = release •14d−−→ delete | release •−→ archive
| release→+ delete | delete ← archive
| readmit→% delete
| unarchive • 8y←− archive .
(12)
As for markings, we assume that initially, the patient is already
admitted. Although the textual description of the model above
does not say so explicitly, it stands to reason that it should not
be possible to delete patient records prior to release. Hence,
for our initial marking, we leave that event excluded:
M0 = release : (⊥,>,⊥),
delete : (⊥,⊥,⊥), archive : (⊥,>,⊥),
unarchive : (⊥,>,⊥), readmit : (⊥,>,⊥) .
Altogether, our model is P0 = [M0] T0.
B. Example runs
We consider a few runs of this model, presenting them as
tables. Each row starts with the event leading to the current
marking, which is represented by the rest of the row.
The common case: provisions and obligations. Refer to
Figure 5. The first row describes the initial marking M0. No
event is previously executed as all h (happened) columns are
⊥. All events but delete are included as can be seen from
the i (included) columns. No events are pending since all r
columns are ⊥. We walk through the sequence of events.
1) release is executed. The age of release is set to “just
executed” (h = 0). Looking at our constraints T0 in (12),
we see that executing release imposes obligations to
delete within 14 days and to eventually archive; these
obligations are reflected in the marking by the change
to r = 14d for the former and r = ω for the latter.
Moreover, T0 also stipulates that delete is now included,
which is reflected in the marking by the change to i = >.
2) 4d passes. The age of release and the deadline for delete
are respectively incremented and decremented by 4 days.
Note that the “eventual” deadline ω for archive remains
as ω − 4d = ω.
3) archive is executed. This meets the deadline of archive,
which is then cleared.
4) 1d passes. The age and deadlines are updated.
5) delete is executed. The deadline for delete is cleared.
Note that unarchive still cannot execute as it is con-
ditional on archive having happened at least 8y in the
past.
6) 10y passes. The condition unarchive • 8y←− archive is now
fulfilled, hence unarchive is now executable.
7) unarchive is executed.
An attempted violation. Will records be deleted? Consider the
run in Figure 6. The event delete has deadline 0 at the end
of the run and is still included. That means that the minimum
response deadline, deadline(M) is now 0, and so the tick-
transition cannot fire, that is, time cannot advance. (Obviously,
an enforcement mechanism cannot rely on stopping time;
rather, it must take care to avoid finding itself in a situation
where advancing time would violate the policy. We will
return to this in Section V-A.) Hence, the model prevents this
potential policy violation by refusing to let time pass in this
state. To allow time to pass again, we must either re-admit the
patient (thereby excluding the pending delete event), releasing
the patient again (thereby extending the deadline of delete by
another 14 days), or delete the records. Neither re-admitting
nor releasing the patient again make sense as a general way to
enforce the policy. And we cannot delete the records straight
away since, because of the milestone delete ← archive and
the fact that archive is pending, we must first archive the
records—see Figure 7.
As we will see in Section V, this policy is enforceable
only if either the event readmit, the event release, or both the
events archive and delete can be executed by the PEP. Also
note that if, for instance, only archive but not delete can be
controlled by the PEP, then one can consider policy redesign.
For instance, one can introduce an event notify (notifying the
IT Department’s Data Retention Officer of undeleted data) that
is controllable by the PEP, is enabled when the deadline of
delete is met, and cancels the delete event by excluding it.
release •14d−−→ notify | notify • 14d←−− release | notify→% delete .
This is an instance of a general escalation pattern for dealing
with uncontrollable events with deadlines. It is suggestive
of the way obligations are often traditionally treated: rather
than preventing the original policy from being violated, the
enforcement mechanism triggers remedial actions such as
notifications or logging information for subsequent audits.
Re-admission—dynamic exclusion of obligations. Figure 8
presents the case where a patient is readmitted. The initial
markings in the first two events follow the first example: the
patient is release’ed, and four days pass (row 4d). The patient
is readmit’ted. Following the rules T0, readmit excludes the
delete event (i = ⊥). Ten days pass (row 10d). Notice that the
deadline for delete reaches zero. However, this zero-deadline
does not prevent time from progressing further: because delete
is excluded, this zero does not contribute to the computation
of the minimum deadline deadline(M). So another four days
pass (row 4d). By the definition of tick〈−〉, the deadline for
Event release delete archive unarchive readmit
h i r h i r h i r h i r h i r
– ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
release 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > 14d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
4d 4d > ⊥ ⊥ > 10d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
archive 4d > ⊥ ⊥ > 10d 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
1d 5d > ⊥ ⊥ > 9d 1d > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
delete 5d > ⊥ 0 > ⊥ 1d > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
10y 10y5d > ⊥ 10y > ⊥ 10y1d > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
unarchive 10y5d > ⊥ 10y > ⊥ 10y1d > ⊥ 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
Fig. 5. “Common case” run.
Event release delete archive unarchive readmit
h i r h i r h i r h i r h i r
– ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
release 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > 14d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
14d 14d > ⊥ ⊥ > 0 ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
Fig. 6. “Attempted violation” run.
archive 14d > ⊥ ⊥ > 0 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
delete 14d > ⊥ 0 > ⊥ 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
Fig. 7. Continuation of the “attempted violation” run.
Event release delete archive unarchive readmit
h i r h i r h i r h i r h i r
– ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
release 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > 14d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
4d 4d > ⊥ ⊥ > 10d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
readmit 4d > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 10d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ 0 > ⊥
10d 14d > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ 10d > ⊥
4d 18d > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ 14d > ⊥
release 18d > ⊥ ⊥ > 14d ⊥ > ω ⊥ > ⊥ 14d > ⊥
Fig. 8. “Dynamic exclusion of obligations” run.
the excluded delete event cannot become negative and thus
remains zero. When the patient is finally again release’ed,
release has its usual effects: it includes delete, and resets its
deadline to 14d. Note the semantics: an event can have only
one response deadline; setting a new response deadline cancels
the previous one.
V. PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF DCR POLICIES
We now consider what is necessary for a DCR policy to
be proactively enforceable. That is, under what circumstances
does an enforcement mechanism exist for the policy?
A. Enforceability and Time-locks
It might happen that the deadline for meeting an obligation
has arrived, but the action required to meet the obligation
would violate the (overall) security policy.
Example 18: Suppose we were to add the constraints
early •1y−→ unarchive | archive→% early
to the data retention policy T0 given previously in (12). These
new constraints model that the patient can request that his
records are unarchived early, no later than a year after the
request, but this request can only be made before archival.
These new constraints would contradict the old constraint that
unarchival cannot happen before 8 years after archival:
release unarchive archive
h i r h i r h i r
– ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥
release 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > ω
early 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > 1y ⊥ > ω
archive 0 > ⊥ ⊥ > 1y 0 > ⊥
1y 1y > ⊥ ⊥ > 0 1y > ⊥
In the last state, the event unarchive must happen now, but it
cannot due to the required delay of 8 years since archive. The
deadline would be extended by re-executing early, but early
is excluded. This process is not deadlocked: release can still
happen. It is, however, time-locked: it has reached a marking
from which time cannot possibly advance.
Definition 19 ([16]): A process [M ] T is time-locked iff no
marking M ′ reachable from M has T `M ′ tick−−→M ′′.
We conclude that a DCR policy is not necessarily enforce-
able, even if all events are controllable and causable: If there
is a time-lock in a policy, then there are target systems for
which no correct transparent enforcement mechanism exists,
since one cannot prevent time from advancing.
Theorem 20: Let P be the language of a DCR process P
that has a time-lock. Assume that P non-empty and take as tar-
get system (prefixes(P), dom(P )∪{tick}, dom(P ), dom(P )).
Then no transparent enforcement mechanism m is correct
for P .
We can decide whether a DCR policy has a time-lock, using
that its LTS is extended bisimilar [14] to a finite one (see the
Appendix).
Proposition 21: It is decidable whether a DCR process P
is time-lock free.
But decidable is not the same as feasible:
Definition 22: Let P = [M1] T be a DCR process, and let
e be an event of P . We say that e is eventually executable in
P iff there is a transition sequence M1
e1−→ M2 e2−→ · · · en−→
Mn+1
e−→ N .
Lemma 23: There exists an NLOGSPACE-reduction from
boolean satisfiability to eventual executability for time-lock–
free DCR processes.
Theorem 24: (a) Deciding eventual executability of any e in
any DCR process P is NP-hard; and (b) deciding time-lock–
freedom for DCR processes is NP-hard.
B. Avoiding Time-locks
We have just seen that the existence of an enforcement
mechanism for a DCR policy depends at least on the policy’s
time-lock–freedom. We now give a polynomial-time com-
putable sufficient condition for a DCR policy to be time-
lock free, which also supports the effective computation of
a sequence of events that averts violating a given deadline.
We call such a DCR policy “resolvable”. In Section V-C, we
use this notion to define a correct, transparent enforcement
mechanism for resolvable DCR policies.
Definition 25 (Resolvability): Let P = [M ] T be a DCR
process and S ⊆ dom(M) a subset of events. We say that
P is S-resolvable iff for any marking M ′ reachable from M
with deadline(M ′) = 0, there exists a {e1, . . . , en} ⊆ S such
that (1) the following is a transition sequence:
M ′ e1−→M ′1 e2−→ · · · en−→M ′n
and (2) deadline(M ′n) > 0. Assume a particular choice of
such a sequence and define resolve([M ′] T ) to be the (partial)
function that exhibits this choice.
That is, in any reachable state with one or more deadlines
about to be missed, one may execute some sequence of the
events in the set S to avoid missing those deadlines.
Lemma 26: A DCR process P is time-lock–free iff it is
S-resolvable for some S.
Example 27: It is easily verified that the policy T0 given
in Section IV is S-resolvable for S = {release}, or S =
{readmit}, or S = {delete, archive}.
Note that a DCR process P can be time-lock–free and
yet have no way to accept, e.g., [e : (⊥,>, ω)] e • 0←− e. This
lemma has the subtle consequence that resolvability does not
entail that any trace of P can be extended to an accepting one.
From Proposition 21 and Theorem 24, we can bound the
complexity of determining resolvability, for some S.
Proposition 28: Let P be a DCR process and let S ⊆
dom(M). It is decidable, but NP-hard, whether a P is S-
resolvable.
Given NP-hardness, we need tractable approximations to
resolvability. We begin by considering which events may reach
deadlines. We call these busy events.
Definition 29: An event e is busy in [M ] T iff there exists
a reachable marking M ′ with e : (i,>, k) ∈ M ′ for some
k 6= ⊥ and some i.
Note that as defined, busy events may have the indefinite
deadline ω. We can identify busy events in time polynomial
in the size of the DCR process:
Lemma 30: An event e is busy in [M ] T only if for some
k 6= ⊥ either e : (i,>, k) ∈M for some i or f •k−→ e ∈ T for
some f .
The only way to violate an obligation is to neither execute
nor exclude a busy event when its deadline comes up. Clearly,
either (1) the busy event must be under the enforcement
mechanism’s control or (2) an alternative event that excludes
the busy event must be under the enforcement mechanism’s
control. In the following, we will focus just on the first option.
To this end, we define dependable events.
Definition 31: An event e is dependable in P iff in any P ′
reachable from P , the event e is either excluded or enabled.
The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 32: Let P be a DCR process, let B be the set of
busy events of P , and suppose every event in B is dependable.
Then P is B-resolvable.
This proposition gives us an approximation for resolvability
that can be computed in time polynomial in P , since we can
approximate the busy events using Lemma 30 and dependable
events with those that have no conditions or milestones. In
practice, however, it is unlikely that every busy event is
dependable. For example, in the example of Section IV, delete
is busy, but not dependable: it has a milestone from archive,
and so may be included but not enabled. We will need to
consider the dependencies of busy events.
Definition 33: Let P = [M ] T , and let e be an event of P .
The inhibitors of e is the set
I(e) = {f | ∃k.e • k←− f ∨ e ← f} .
Let the inhibition graph I(P ) of P be the directed graph that
has nodes dom(P ) (P ’s events) and an edge from f to e iff
f ∈ I(e). For a subset of events X , define the inhibition
subgraph for X as the subgraph of I(P ) comprising every
event f with a path to some e ∈ X in I(P ) and every edge
on those paths. We denote this graph IˆP (X) and its set of
nodes IP (X), dropping the subscript P when it is clear from
context. We call the set I(X) the inhibition closure of X .
The inhibitors of an event e is (the transitive closure of)
those events that may cause e to be not executable, because
they are milestones or conditions for e.
Definition 34: Let X be a set of events of a DCR process
[M ] T . We say that X is dependable iff the following three
conditions hold.
1) The inhibition graph Iˆ(X) is acyclic.
2) For any two nodes e, f in Iˆ(X), if there is a relation
e •k−→ f for some k or a relation e→+ f , then there is
a path from e to f .
3) For any two nodes e, f in Iˆ(X), if there is a relation
f • k←− e for some k, then k = 0.
Intuitively, a set of events is dependable if, when we
build the graph of those events’ dependencies (milestones
and conditions), the dependencies form a directed acyclic
graph (1), and we can eventually execute any event in the
set by simply executing the events in that acyclic graph in a
topological order, i.e., “bottom-up”.
Care must be taken because of the interplay between re-
sponses and milestones. We must avoid the situation where
resolving a dependency by executing it re-blocks a previously
resolved dependency by either reinstating a milestone or a
condition (2). Similarly, we must ensure that no event in the
set depends any other event in the set with a delay (3).
Theorem 35 (Approximation of Resolvability): Let P have
busy events B. If B is dependable, then P is I(B)-resolvable.
Moreover, there exists a polynomial time algorithm computing
resolve of Definition 25 for every P ′ reachable from P .
The actual algorithm is simply this: Given a subset X ⊆ B,
resolve(B) is the topological sort of Iˆ(X).
Example 36: We return to our data retention example P0 of
Equation (12) on page 8. Inspecting the relations, we see that
the inhibition graph has only the two edges:
archive 7→ unarchive archive 7→ delete .
The busy events of P0 are over-approximated by Lemma 30 to
B = {delete, archive}. The inhibition subgraph and inhibition
closure of B are then simply IˆP0(B) = archive 7→ delete and
IP0(B) = {archive, delete}. It is straightforward to verify that
IP0(B) is dependable. By Theorem 35, it is thus decidable in
polynomial time that P0 is indeed {archive, delete}-resolvable.
Summing up, if we have the ability to execute archive and
delete we can guarantee compliance for obligations.
C. Proactive DCR Policy Enforcement
With the mechanics of statically avoiding time-locks in
DCR policies in place, we now define an enforcement mech-
anism, from which we derive a prototype implementation
of a PEP. First note that a DCR process directly defines a
policy language in the sense of Definition 2. We define an
enforcement mechanism for a process P .
Definition 37: Define a function m(·, ·) that, for a given
DCR policy P with dom(P ) ⊆ Σ\{tick} and action a ∈ Σ,
says what actions to take.
m(P, a) =

resolve(P ) · tick (i)
when a = tick ∧ deadline(P ) = 0
 when a ∈ dom(P ) and (ii)
a is not executable in P
a otherwise (iii)
We lift m to finite sequences of actions. We must advance
the “current” DCR policy whenever the target system takes
an action. Let a〈P 〉 = P ′ iff P a−→ P ′. This is well-defined
because the transition semantics of DCR processes in Figure
4 assigns at most one transition for any a, P and each event
has a unique label. Moreover, define advance(P, ) = P and
advance(P, a ·w) = advance(a〈P 〉, w), for w ∈ Σ∗. Then the
DCR enforcement mechanism mP is given inductively by
mP () = 
mP (w · a) = mP (w) ·m(advance(P,mP (w)), a) .
Note that mP is not defined for all P , since resolve
(Definition 25) is only defined on resolvable DCR processes.
Theorem 38: Let t = (S,Σ,Γ,∆) be a target system, and
let P be a DCR process with dom(P ) = Σ and dependable
busy events B ⊆ ∆, and assume every event Σ \Γ is enabled
in any P ′ reachable from P . Then mP is a correct, transparent
enforcement mechanism.
From Lemma 8, we know then that mP steers clear of the
finite violations language:
Corollary 39: Let P and mP be defined as in the Theo-
rem 38. Then for all w ∈ Dm we have w 6∈ P¯ .
To apply DCR policy enforcement in practice, we require:
1) A target system (S,Σ,Γ,∆),
2) A DCR policy P over Σ such that P is ∆-resolvable,
and every P ′ reachable from P has every e ∈ Σ \ Γ
enabled, and
3) A PEP implementing mP .
For (1), note that the causable actions ∆ must be enabled in
the target system whenever they are to be caused according
to the policy P : otherwise the PEP cannot rely on executing
them to avert deadlines. In practice, this either requires (some)
white-box knowledge of the target system, for example, the
knowledge that these actions are always available when needed
or that the actions are always enabled, e.g. the actions are
provided as a web service.
For (2), apply Theorem 35 to get resolvability. We do
not address here the means of ensuring that uncontrollable
events, i.e., events in Σ \ Γ, are always enabled. Several
options exists along the lines of Theorem 35. A very pragmatic
approach is simply to require the events Σ\Γ to be completely
unconstrained in P . Alternatively, it suffices for the set Σ \ Γ
to be empty. This will be the case when the target system must
ask the PEP for permission on all (policy-relevant) actions and
is analogous to the principle of complete mediation for access
control policies.
// A PEP takes as input an Observation which is
// either an (attempted) transition, or a deadline
// approaching.
type Observation =
| Transition of DCR.event
| Deadline of DCR.event
| Inform of DCR.event
// A PEP produces as output a Reaction. (Code for
// acting on the Reaction is not included here.)
type Reaction =
| Grant
| Deny
| Cause of DCR.event list
| Ignore
// DCR-PEP. Takes a current DCR policy-state P and
// an Observation, and produces a Reaction and a
// new DCR policy-state.
let PEP P observation =
match observation with
| Deadline e ->
Cause (resolve P e), P // (i)
| Transition e ->
if (DCR.is_executable P e) then
Grant, DCR.execute e P // (iii)
else
Deny, P // (ii)
| Inform e ->
Ignore, DCR.execute e P // (iii)
Fig. 9. F# implementation of mP .
For (3), we have constructed a prototype PEP implementing
mp, built on top of the DCR process engine of [7]. This
prototype is available on-line at http://dcr.itu.dk/obligations.
Our prototype PEP repeatedly waits to either be consulted
about an action by the target system, or for a deadline to come
close, in either case acting as m of Definition 37: For actions,
it grants or denies depending on whether the corresponding
event is executable in the current DCR policy state. When
actions are granted, the state is advanced by executing the
event in it. For deadlines, the PEP instructs the target system
to issue actions as given by resolve. Since we have assumed
that non-controllable events Σ \ Γ are always enabled, they
need no special treatment.
We give the actual F# code implementing m in Figure 9.
Note the comments connecting various branches to cases
of Definition 37. Note too the use of the resolve algorithm
provided of Definition 25, guaranteed to exist by Theorem 35.
Our prototype uses the policy P also as the target system;
this is enough for experimentation and simulation in the DCR
Workbench. To lift the prototype to an actual enforcement
mechanism, it suffices to update the driver function producing
the Observation inputs and executing the Reaction
outputs of Figure 9 to one that interacts, say, via REST, with an
actual system, as dictated by the system model of Section II.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we compare our approach with related
policy specification languages for handling obligations and
with alternative enforcement mechanisms.
A. Specification
The idea of adding obligations to policies was first proposed
by Minsky and Lockman [26]. They augmented permissions
with tasks to be executed within a stated deadline after
an access request is granted. This deadline corresponds, for
example, to the passage of time or is triggered by other events.
Park and Sandhu examined obligations in the context of usage
control [28] and Bettini et al. [4] systematically considered the
combination of provisions and obligations within a datalog for-
malism. In both cases, the emphasis is on policy specification
(and, in the case of [4], also analysis), rather than applications
to enforcement and monitoring.
Obligations have also been used in languages such as PON-
DER [6] and XACML [34]. Obligations there are triggered
by events: an event’s occurrence directly results in actions to
discharge the obligation. This is in contrast to our work where
obligations are associated with events that become pending but
need not be immediately discharged.
Temporal logics are, of course, well suited for specifying
properties based on the past (provisions) and future (obliga-
tions). For example, linear-time temporal logics (LTL) have
been used in [3], [12], [18], [35] to formalise regulations
with obligations and usage-control policies. LTL formulas
are closely related to DCR processes: Core (untimed) DCR
processes are equivalent in their expressivity to ω-regular
languages [8], whereas (propositional) LTL is equivalent to
a subset of ω-regular languages, namely the star-free lan-
guages [33]. DCR processes also have the advantage that
their operational semantics does not depend on the possibly
exponential translation to (e.g. Bu¨chi) automata, which is most
often employed for LTL; see, for example, the use of LTL and
Bu¨chi automata to formalise (untimed) obligations in [9].
B. Enforcement
Obligations are fundamentally more difficult to enforce than
provisions. For provisions, policy monitoring and enforcement
are equivalent. Any enforceable policy can be monitored as
the enforcement mechanism’s denial of an action signifies a
policy violation when that action takes place. Conversely, a
monitor can serve as a policy decision point for an enforce-
ment mechanism. When policies contain obligations, there are
monitorable policies that cannot be enforced, in particular
when one distinguishes, as we have done (see also [20]),
between actions that can be controlled by the enforcement
mechanism versus those that can only be observed [1].
Our solution is for the (standard) setting where one interacts
with the target system as a black box, which one can neither
examine nor modify. Even with these restrictions, enforceabil-
ity is a rich concept that depends on the underlying mechanism
used [11], [13], for example, whether the mechanism can only
suppress actions, like security automata [31], or can initiate or
change actions as with edit automata [23], [24] or mandatory
results automata (MRA) [25].
As with our approach, edit automata and MRA share the
ability to proactively change behaviour to enforce policies.
They differ though in that neither formalism handles real-
time constraints, which is an essential aspect of obligations.
Their system models are quite different too. Our system model
essentially extends that of security automata with additional
target-system interfaces of controllable and causable actions.
The MRA system model interposes the enforcement mecha-
nism between the target system and an execution platform. For
edit automata, no distinction is made between observable and
controllable events and hence it remains open what an edit
automaton can actually control on the target system.
A number of enforcement mechanisms have been proposed
for obligations, like those for PONDER and XACML, which
do not involve any sophisticated calculations. They enforce
obligations simply by executing the appropriate actions (such
as logging information) when the obligation to do so arises.
Li et al. [22] provide operational extensions to XACML
enforcement such as support for pre-obligations and on-going
obligations, as introduced in the UCON model [28]—see also
Elrakaiby et al. [10] who study enforcement of UCON-style
obligations in the context of active databases.
Finally, there is related work in other communities. For
example, in supervisory-control theory for discrete event sys-
tems [29], a supervisor process (in our work, enforcement
mechanism) attempts to control the behaviour of a generator
process (in our work, the target system) over its controllable
events, which corresponds to our mechanism without the
ability to force actions. Subsequent extensions of supervisory-
control theory to timed discrete event systems [5], [32] include
delays and deadlines of each event and a designated subset
of so-called forcible events. The supervisor process can now
disable the tick (time) actions in case a forcible event is
enabled. But the target system may choose to perform a non-
forcible event; indeed the supervisor cannot enforce that a
forcible event happens as in our approach. Also closely related
is the research of Renard et al. [30] who present an automata-
based framework for enforcing regular timed properties with
uncontrollable events. Their enforcement mechanisms work by
buffering and delaying input events so that the output satisfies
a specified policy. Again, in contrast, our mechanisms do not
buffer and delay, but actively schedule controllable events to
prevent obligations’ violations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Obligations are a central notion found in a wide range
of security policies such as those for usage control, data
protection and privacy, and digital rights management. We
have investigated their specification and enforcement in a
black-box setting where the enforcement mechanism proac-
tively computes and schedules events needed to prevent policy
violations. As not all policies in this setting are enforceable,
we have also established complexity results for enforceability
and given a sufficient polynomial-time verifiable condition for
a policy to be enforceable.
The present work investigates avoiding the violation of
obligations by proactively taking action. We have assumed
that the sequence of actions caused proactively can always be
executed within a single time-step. If time is measured in hours
or days this is usually reasonable, but for finer granularities of
time or if resolving an obligation requires delays, one needs to
support tick actions during enforcement. This support would
require generalising Definition 34 of dependable sets.
The approach of this paper is not limited to obligations: one
can reasonably consider proactively avoiding the violations of
provisions too. For example, suppose we have the provision
“action a can happen only if b previously happened”, and
suppose the string w contains no occurrences of b. The present
approach would suppress a, i.e., m(w · a) = m(w). However,
we might instead cause the action b to happen before allowing
a: m(w · a) = m(w) · b · a.
Finally, with respect to the usefulness of proactive enforce-
ment in practice, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
We are presently engaged in a large-scale case study of policy
enforcement with a major European railway service. While
it seems that our policy language is well-suited for capturing
temporal constraints between actions, the formalism presented
here does not handle actions depending on data. An extension
to handle data is currently underway.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs
Here we provide the remaining proofs for all lemmas and
theorems in the paper.
Proof of Lemma 8: Let v ∈ Dm. Observe that from
Definition 5, m(v) is finite. It follows by the definition of
correctness that m(v) ∈ prefixes(P); but then m(v) 6∈ P¯ .
Proof of Theorem 20: Suppose m is correct and trans-
parent. By the definition of a time-lock, there exists a w ∈
prefixes(P) such that w is a shortest sequence exhibiting a
time-lock in lts(P ). Because m is transparent, w ∈ Dm and
m(w) = w. Because w exhibits a time-lock, w is not accepting
and so w 6∈ P . Let v ∈ dom(P )∗. By the definition of a time-
lock, w · v is also not accepting. But then m is not correct,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 21: Immediate from Proposition 43.
Proof of Lemma 23: Let B be a boolean satisfiability
problem over atoms, conjunction and negation, that is, B is a
string generated by the language
S ::= x | S ∧ S | ¬S .
Construct a DCR process JBK which has, for each non-leaf
node n of the abstract syntax tree of B, events nt, nf and
nb1, nb2, nb3; and for each atom a nodes at, af and ab1, ab2.
For each non-leaf node n, add relations as follows.
1) For each atom a, add relations ab1 •←− ab1 and ab2 •←−
ab2; and at •←− ab1 and af •←− ab2 and at →+ ab2 and
af →+ ab1.
2) For each non-leaf node n, add relations nb1 •←−
nb1, nb2 •←− nb2, nb3 •←− nb3.
3) For each non-leaf node n = u ∧ v add relations nt •←−
nb1, nt •←− nb2 and nf •←− nb3; and ut →% nb1, vt →%
nb2; and uf →% nb3, vf →% nb3.
4) For each non-leaf node n = ¬u add relations nt •←− uf
and nf •←− ut.
Define a marking M0 where every event is (⊥,>,⊥), except
ab1 and ab2 which must be (⊥,⊥,⊥). Consider a run of JBK
executing a maximal number of distinct events of JBK. Note
that for each atom a; either at or af has been executed, but
not both; define from this an assignment a 7→ > or a 7→ ⊥.
By induction, each non-leaf node n has nt executed iff this
assignment evaluates n true and nf executed iff it evaluates n
false. But then for the root node r of B, rt is executed in some
run iff B is satisfiable and rf is executed in some run iff it is
not; i.e., rt is eventually executable in JBK iff B is satisfiable.
The DCR process JBK has O(|B|) nodes and relations, and
so this reduction is in NLOGSPACE. By inspection of the
reduction, we see that JBK contains no responses or initially
pending events; it is then trivially time-lock–free.
Proof of Theorem 24: (a) is immediate from Lemma 23.
For (b), let B be a boolean satisfiability problem, suppose
(JBK, e) is the corresponding eventual execution problem,
and suppose JBK = [M ] T . Choose f 6∈ dom(M). Then
[f : (⊥,>, 0),M ] T | f • 0←− e is time-lock free iff f is even-
tually executable iff B has a satisfying assignment.
Proof of Lemma 26: Suppose P is not S-resolvable for
any S. By definition, there exists then a state from which time
cannot advance after any finite sequence of events, and so P
has a time-lock. Suppose instead P is S-resolvable for some
S, and suppose for a contradiction that P ′ is reachable from P
and is time-locked. But then resolve(P ′) is defined and leads
to a state in which time has advanced. Contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 30: Immediate from the Definition of
busy events.
Proof of Theorem 38: We show (a) that mP is a
function, (b) that it is an enforcement mechanism in the sense
of Definition 5, and (c) that it is a correct such mechanism.
For (a), by Theorem 35, the function resolve is defined on
every reachable marking of P , and so mP is a function.
For (b), it is straightforward to show by cases on m(·, ·)
that mP is monotone and idempotent. For the properties, (1)
is immediate by the definition of mP . (2a-c) are immediate
by the definition of m.
For (c), mP is correct. Consider mP (v) for some v ∈ Dm.
Note inductively using the definition of mP (v) and that Σ \Γ
are always enabled that mP (v) is a run of P . We must prove
that this run is accepting or can be extended to an accepting
one. If it is already accepting, then we are done, so suppose it
is not. Again by Theorem 35 B is resolvable, so any pending
response can be discharged; it follows that mP (v) can be
extended to an accepting run. Finally, mP is transparent, which
follows straightforwardly from the definition of m.
Lemma 40: If X is dependable for [M ] T , then so is any
Y ⊆ X .
Proof: Immediate from the definition.
Proof of Theorem 35: Suppose M ′ is reachable from
M , and suppose X is the maximal set of events satisfying
x : (ix, 1, 0) ∈ M ′ for x ∈ X and some ixs. We must prove
that there is some finite set of events {e1, . . . , em} ⊆ I(X)
such that
M ′ e1−→M ′1 e2−→ · · · em−−→M ′m (13)
is an event transition sequence and deadline(M ′m) > 0. Clearly
each x ∈ X is busy, X ⊆ B, and X is dependable by
Lemma 40. Because X is dependable, Iˆ(X) is acyclic. Let
e1, . . . , en be a topological sorting of Iˆ(X). We prove by
induction on n that:
1) a subsequence of e1, . . . , en is a transition sequence
from M ′,
2) at each M ′i , ei is either enabled or excluded, and
3) at each M ′j with j > i, ei is excluded if it was at M
′
i ,
pending only if it is excluded, and executed otherwise.
For k = 1, by the definition of Iˆ(X), e1 has no conditions
or milestones and so is either enabled or excluded (2). If
it is enabled, we keep and execute it, otherwise we forget
about it (1). (3) is vacuously true. For k > 1 we know
that all of the conditions and milestones of ek are among
e1, . . . , ek−1, and by the induction hypothesis (2) and (3) each
of those are either executed or excluded. By Definition 34
of dependability, item 3, if ek has a condition to an earlier
ej , it is with time constraint 0. Thus ek is enabled iff it is
included. If it is excluded we have (1,2). If it is included and
so enabled, we execute it to establish (1,2). By Definition 34
of dependability, item 2, executing ek does not make any of
e1, . . . , ek−1 pending or included, establishing (3).
Clearly, each x ∈ X are among e1, . . . , en, and by con-
struction, each x is either excluded or executed in M ′n. By the
definition of dependability, if follows that deadline(M ′n) > 0.
This proof also provides an algorithm for computing resolve:
Simply compute Iˆ(X) from its definition—clearly in polyno-
mial time—and topologically sort the resulting graph.
B. Finite LTS for Timed DCR Processes
We define a finite LTS. To simplify the definition, we use the
same limit for all events, namely the maximal delay occurring
in the term T identified by the function maxdelay defined as
follows:
maxdelay(e • k←− f) = k
maxdelay(e R f) = 0 (when R6= e • k←− f )
maxdelay(T | U) = max{maxdelay(T ),maxdelay(U)} .
We then inductively define a function that truncates a marking
to a given maximum delay, taking |k = , and
M, e : (h, i, r)|k = M|k, e : (min{k, h}, i, r) .
We say that markings M and M ′are k-equivalent if M|k =
M ′|k, and define the bounded LTS as the quotient.
Definition 41: Let [M ] T be a DCR process with k =
maxdelay(T ). We define the bounded LTS ltsb([M ] T ) =
(M|k, E ′,→,M|k, `′,Σ), with components events E ′ = E unionmulti
{tick}; transitions → ⊆M|k ×E ′×M|k, with M|k α−→M ′|k
iff T ` M|k α−→ M ′; states M|k = {M ′|k | M →∗ M ′},
initial state M|k, and labelling `′(e) = `(e), for e ∈ E and
`′(tick) = tick.
Finiteness is immediate by noting that the first state compo-
nent, the age, is bounded by the maximum delay, while the
third state component, the response deadline, is bounded by
the maximum response given by the initial marking and all
response relations e •k−→ f .
We define accepting runs for the bounded LTS as for the
timed event LTS.
Lemma 42: Let [M ] T be a DCR process with k =
maxdelay(T ). Then T ` M α−→ M ′ iff T ` M|k α−→ M ′′
with M ′′|k = M ′|k.
Proof: By structural induction on T , we have [M ] T `
e : δ iff [M|k] T ` e : δ. Now note that ((e : δ)〈M〉)|k =
((e : δ)〈M|k〉)|k and tick〈M〉|k = tick〈M|k〉|k. The lemma
follows using the definition of transitions in Figure 4.
Proposition 43: Let P = [M ] T be a DCR process, and
let k = maxdelay(T ). Then P = [M ] T in lts(P ) and P|k =
[M|k] T in ltsb(P ) are bisimilar and the languages of the two
LTSes coincide, that is, lang(lts(P )) = lang(ltsb(P )).
Proof: Assume k = maxdelay(T ). By Lemma 42 it
follows that {(M ′,M ′|k) | M →∗ M ′} is a bisimulation.
Moreover, for any M , the second and third components of M|k
are identical, so this bisimulation is an extended bisimulation
in the sense of [14] that respects the acceptance of runs.
